W. Tecumseh Fitch (What to think about machines that think)

W. Tecumseh Fitch argues that despite advances in computing power, current computers don’t possess true thinking abilities like organic minds. He introduces the concept of nano-intentionality, the ability of living cells to change their material form in response to their environment, which he claims is an essential feature of organic minds but absent in silicon-based computers.

Fitch delves into the philosophical debate around intentionality, addressing the issue of how mental entities, such as thoughts, beliefs, and desires, can be connected to objects in the real world. He contends that living matter’s plasticity, particularly in neurons, allows a feedback loop to connect mental events to actions within our bodies, granting our mental activities intrinsic causal intentionality.

He asserts that machines can “think,” “know,” or “understand” only when meaning is added by intentional, interpreting agents with brains, and any intelligence in AI is derived from their creators. Fitch dismisses fears of an AI uprising or AI rights movement, as machines lack intrinsic intentionality. Instead, he warns against the tendency to misattribute intentions and understanding to inanimate objects, which can lead to catastrophic system failures when responsibilities are shifted to machines. Fitch emphasizes that machines don’t truly think, and this belief poses risks as we increasingly rely on them.

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